profession's emergence and initial regulation, which also occurred during this period. 4 The Imparlial Lawyer, perhaps the first treatise on the legal profession "setting forth such Special Adjudged Cases as immediately concern such persons exercis'd in the Laws of England,"
'5 includes defamation actions brought by lawyers. 6 Thus, lawyer defamation should be included in the early modern law of lawyering. In contrast, most current commentators do not consider defamation part of today's law of lawyering, 7 although slandering a lawyer's professional reputation or wrongfully accusing him of a conflict of interest are in all likelihood actionable per se. 8 As the subsequent discussion will show, accusing a lawyer of being an ambidexter was a very serious charge. Nothing was more defamatory than charging a lawyer with disloyalty to a client. Moreover, the word "ambidexter" signified substantial opprobrium in the evolving doctrine of actionable defamation as well as in a broader societal context, as evidenced in religious and literary works conveying public images of disloyal lawyers. Thus, it seems probable that both the concept of disloyalty and the word commonly used to express it account for the 
The Impartial Lawyer title page (1709). This book further defines its contents as "wherein is Demonstrated, what Remedy Lawyers and Lawful
Officers may have, against such as would defame and defraud them. As also, such Relief as others may have against them, for their unjust or irregular proceedings." Id.
6. Id at 12-18, 69-78, 204-06. 7. Conflict-based defamation suits seem less frequent in United States tort law than in the initial era of secular defamation. With regard to U.S. tort law, less than 5 percent of the identified lawyer defamation suits involved actions based on accusations of conflict of interest. However, the forty-five early modern defamation cases discussing ambidexterity constitute about 35 percent of all the lawyer defamation cases during that period. Although making judgments about the extent of litigation is difficult, the following statistics may provide some rough estimates in comparing current U.S. and early modem English defamation. I have identified 233 lawyer defamation cases in the U.S. since the mid-nineteenth century. Of those, only ten involved lawyers suing because they were accused of a conflict of interest. Although lawyers are not generally treated as public figures, many actions alleging conflict-based defamation involved lawyers who may have been public figures either by the nature of their office or because of their connection to a public controversy. See fame, condition, conversation, reputation and esteem ... among divers venerable, honourable and eminent men and all other subjects whatsoever of the said lady the present queen" and that defendant was "scheming wholly to deprive [him] of his credit, good name, fame and reputation... in order to bring [him] into the hatred of all venerable and other subjects of [Queen Elizabeth]." 15 He pleaded his nonprofessional social stature in the typical way-that he was an esquire and "good, true and faithful liegeman" of the queen-and declared his professional status and expertise, that he had been and still was "learned and expert in the laws of this realm of England."' 16 He noted his extensive retention as counsel as well as that he had earned "exceedingly great gains, profits and fees justly."' 1 7 He then alleged the negative impact of the defamation on his practice, stating that he had "not only fallen into great scandal, infamy and discredit... but also many men, his clients, have held and still do hold [him] in such distrust and misgiving [because of the slanderous words] that they have entirely desisted and still do desist from retaining [him] .'
18
Coke's case is typical of those by lawyers accused of ambidexterity in many ways, although also different in a few. Like some other plaintiffs, Coke used the Latin word ambidexter in his declaration although it was not one of the English defamatory words. 19 Further, in addition to using language traditional to occupational defamation, he specifically alleged twice in his declaration that he had been accused of a "false crime," an atypical inclusion in professional defamation cases. 20 Additionally noteworthy is Coke's status as a famous personage. Coke's 19. Coke said the imputation caused him "to be known and proclaimed . .. as an ambidexter." Coke, KB 27/1293 m 322.
20. Coke noted the income lost due to utterance of the "false crime and slanderous words" and the huge expenditures spent "for clearing and purging himself of this false crime." Coke, KB 27/1293 m 322.
Coke was not alone in alleging a crime in an ambidexterity defamation case. See, for example, Norton v Sharlowe, KB 27/1220 (Michaelmas Term 1565). Although Coke was represented by an attorney in this matter, he may have played a role in the drafting since he may have considered himself to have a special expertise and interest in defamation. Coke had represented Lord Cromwell in a well known scandalum magnatum case, Lord Cromwell v Denny, 2 Coke's Reports, Part III 282 (1579); 4 Natl Biography at 685 (cited in note 12). In the same year as his own defamation case, Coke represented a plaintiff in a defamation case who was accused of falsifying a record and seeking the defendant's death. In arguing for the actionability of the words, Coke stated that they should be taken in malampartem as they were spoken in "heat and anger," just as it is actionable "when a man who is angry with his counsellor says that he is an ambidexter." Adam's Case, BL MS Lansd 1057, ff 51r-51v (KB 1585), reprinted in Helmholz, Select Cases at 79-80 (cited in note declaration emphasized his view of his exceptional reputation and professional competence, 21 exemplified by the high amount of his C1000 claim for damages.
In bringing his case, Coke used the evolving law of defamation. 22 Although the ecclesiastical and local courts had recognized defamation as a cause of action since the thirteenth century, it did not become actionable in the royal courts until the early sixteenth century. 23 As the secular cause of action for defamation developed, lawyers instituted a number of actions. 24 In fact, the first judgment in a defamation suit in 1517 involved a counsel accused of murder and treason. 24. I am in the process of a larger study of defamation suits by lawyers and their influence on the development of professional and occupational defamation. I have identified approximately 150 defamation suits by lawyers in the initial era of secular defamation, the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Helmholz's collection of local court defamation cases contains none brought by lawyers. See Helmholz, Select Cases at xlix-lviii, 27-39 (cited in note 11).
25. 
THE ACCUSATIONS OF AMBIDEXTERITY AND THEIR ACTIONABILITY
This section will start by examining the initial cases in the first few decades of the sixteenth century. These early cases give a good flavor of defamation suits brought by lawyers accused of ambidexterity and the general nature of the pleadings. The cases discussed subsequently illustrate the changing nature of the defamatory words and provide greater insight into the details of pleading and the essential elements of actionable defamation.
A. THE INITIAL CASES
In the first years, common law courts recognized actionable defamation in a group of ambidexterity cases involving lawyers. In 1513, Richard Elyot, a king's serjeant, sued over an accusation that he had accepted retainers against the Crown. 26. I have identified about thirty defamation cases during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries that involved an imputation of ambidexterity and about fifteen additional cases that discuss the defamatory nature of being called an ambidexter. I have included as ambidexterity cases those alleging revelation of a client's secrets to his adversary since breach of the duty of confidentiality was so often associated with ambidexterity. In one case, Robert of Kelsey, a London serjeant, brought a defamation suit in the city court, alleging that he had been accused of acting against a former client on behalf of a current client and knowing the current counsel of the former client. The defendant admitted the words. The plaintiff denied the conflict of interest, stating that he had never represented the defendant. The parties settled. The defendant withdrew his allegations and promised not to repeat them. See Calendar of Ci , Letter-Book C 185-87, discussed in Brand, Origins at 137-38 (cited in note 4).
27. Efyot v Tofte, KB 27/1006 m 62 (Hilary Term 1513). The plaintiff asked for £200 in damages and the defendant denied the allegations. No result is indicated. In this case, the declaration alleged that defendant had composed and written the defamatory words as well as spoken them. In the same year as the case, Elyot was appointed a Common Pleas justice. John Sainty, The Judges of England Two other cases, Southworth v Bady and Arscott v Escolt, may also have involved ambidexterity, but the plaintiffs' declarations are more general and do not explicitly allege such an imputation. 30 All five lawyers pleaded their office, their good reputation, and the impact of the defamation on their clients and fees. Elyot alleged that he was "serviens domini Regis ad legem et eruditus in lege regni Anglie." 31 Waller and Damet alleged that they were common attorneys of the bench, 32 and Oliver Southworth that he was a court clerk and also an attorney. 33 John Arscott alleged that he was a counsel "in lege regni domini Regis Angk'ae edoctus et eruditus." 34 In alleging their good character, the plaintiffs used phrases such as "faithful and true" attorneys, "without stain of falsehood," and "in good faith with [their] clients." In alleging injury, they stated that they acquired great profits for their living and had suffered economic and reputational injury because of the defamation. These standard allegations regarding the plaintiff's reputation are very similar to allegations in ecclesiastical defamation and early defamation cases involving imputation of a crime. 35 Perhaps most interesting are the nature of the defamatory words and the manner of pleading them. Because of strict pleading requirements, particularly limitations on the plaintiffs ability to use an innuendo (a supplemental explanatory clause in the declaration) to explain the defamatory nature of the words and on the defendant's right to traverse certain of the plaintiff's allegations, actionability depended critically on the declaration being properly pleaded. 36 In the three clear ambidexterity cases, the declaration recounting the defendant's words either used the word "ambidexter" (Walkr v Hobart and Damet v Hanuyn) or specifically described the conflict of interest (Eylot v Tofte). In the instances specifically using "ambidexter," no explanation of the word was provided, suggesting that judges knew its pejorative meaning. Ambidexterity was a serious form of lawyer misconduct for which lawyers were disciplined as well as punished criminally under the Statute of Westminster I, chapter 29. 37 The imputation of disloyalty in Elot is noteworthy for an additional reason. The declaration alleged that the defendant said:
In
[T]he same Richard, while the sworn serjeant at law of the same lord King and of counsel to the same lord King... took from various persons various sums of money to be of their counsel against the same lord King and that the same Richard, while the serjeant of the same lord King and of counsel to him, gave counsel to various persons against the same lord King, his Crown and dignity.
38
A serjeant's acceptance of retainers against the Crown must have been regarded as sufficiently disloyal for a false accusation of such to amount to slander. But such conduct was not classic ambidexterity and was probably not punishable under the Statute of Westminster I. There is some doubt as to the duty of the Crown's legal officers during the medieval period, 39 but such conduct may have impinged on a broader loyalty norm imposed on the king's legal representatives. The declaration in Ejyot said that such conduct was contrary to Richard's duty, his oath to the king, and the law of the king. 4° Considering such an accusation defamatory suggested that such conduct, if it involved merely being adverse to the Crown as opposed to being on both sides of the same litigation, was treated as an expanded form of ambidexterity by the beginning of the sixteenth century.
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In all five cases, the nature of the pleading makes it difficult to ascertain whether the words attributed to the defendant were the actual words spoken by the defendant or simply the plaintiffs paraphrasing. Language, such as allegations in Waller and Damet that the defamatory words were spoken publicly in front of the plaintiffs neighbors, suggest that the declarations contained the defendants' actual words. 42 However, none of the three cases recites the defamatory words in English, which later became the routine practice. At this early point in the evolution of defamation, and with likely experimentation in pleading by lawyers, the practice was more variable in this respect. 43 Plaintiffs in other cases used the word "ambidexter," although not as one of the actual defamatory words. 44 Thus, it is possible that the word "ambidexter" originated with the plaintiff. Eyot contains no language about speaking the slander in public. Likewise, the grammatical construction of the defamatory words in the declaration suggests that the plaintiff added them. Whether originating with the plaintiff or defendant, the use of the word "ambidexter" and description of the specific conflict of interest suggest that the plaintiffs believed they had pleaded actionable defamation. The defendant's plea of not guilty and request for a jury in Damet may suggest that he concurred.
B. THE MIh-SMTEENTH CENTURY
During the next several decades, both the defamatory words and pleadings evince some important changes. For instance, it became routine to plead the actual English defamatory words in the declaration. Most often the defamatory words specifically described the plaintiff's conflict of interest. For example, in Nasshe v Chance, the declaration stated that the plaintiff's client had said, "Master Nasshe you be a false man for you have taken money fyrst of me and nowe you be ageynst me in the same matter and thus you have used many menne whiche in case it wer knowen your heles wolde be turned uppe in Westminster Hall."
45
In Kelett v Watson, the defamatory words, again by a client, were: 'Edward Kellet is a false man for he hathe receyvyd of me and Robert Frauncys and all for one matter of varyance betwene us." 46 Norton v Sharlowe showed a somewhat different form of disloyalty, alleging that the defendant said, 'William Norton was Backis attorney agaynst Bettes and he dyd take twenty shyllynges of Bettes to stay Backis nisi prius." 47 That the accusations detailed the particulars of the plaintiffs alleged disloyalty is not surprising. Detailed accusations were the easiest and dearest manner of impugning, and medieval disciplinary cases invariably described the particulars of the miscreant lawyer's conflict of interest 48 and "ambidexter," caused the plaintiff "to be known and proclaimed ... as an ambidexter." But this is somewhat different than the declarations in Walkr and Damet, which recited that the defendant called the plaintiff an ambidexter.
45. CP 40/1129 m 124 (Trinity Term 1546). Nasshe pleaded that he was "unus attomatorum curiae... de banco." The procedure in this case was interesting as the defendant was attached on a writ of privilege, making the procedure more like that for a bill than for a writ. The defendant's lawyer confessed, pleading non est informatus. The court entered judgment for the plaintiff for £5 6s 8d. Norton PSbarlowe is interesting as the defendant did not plead guilty, as was true in many cases, or enter a plea in the nature of a confession and avoidance, such as admitting to speaking the words but offering to verify their truth. Instead, the plea was a special traverse (absque ho) in which the defendant attempted to give his version of what he said and explain why he said it. The special traverse was an interesting pleading development used by the defendant to deny actionability that complicated pleading. Helmholz, Select Cases at cviii-cxi (cited in note 11). The plaintiff reasserted what he had said in the declaration, as was typical in these cases. No result is indicated.
48. Rose, 7 U Chi L Sch Roundtable at 151-63 (cited in note 3).
rarely used the word "ambidexter." 49 Another interesting change in the defamatory words was that they sometimes included imputations of a lawyer's breach of the duty of confidentiality in addition to or instead of a breach of the loyalty norm. Similarities between the medieval discipline cases and the early modem defamation cases demonstrate the relationship between defamation and legal ethics. Notably, the defamatory words in Nasshe included the disciplinary consequences of ambidexterity: "in case it wer knowen your heles wolde be turned uppe in Westminster Hall."
52 There seems to be little doubt that words detailing a lawyer's particular disloyalty or breach of confidentiality were actionable defamation.
C. THE END OF THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY
As the end of the sixteenth century approached, the nature of the defamatory words took more forms. The regular actual use of the word "ambidexter" began, with the word first clearly appearing as an English word perhaps in 1578. In Kyghly vJeffreys, the plaintiff received judgment for having been called "an evil 49 . In my study of seventy-six cases concerning the discipline and civil liability of lawyers for conflict of interest, not one of the cases actually used the words "ambidexter" or "ambidexterity" even though those were the common contemporary terms for conflict of interest See id. man" and "an ambidexter for you played on both handis you toke money of bothe parties of one Bugden and Balies and I wyll stande to hytt and justyfye the same." 5 3 Judges also considered it actionable to accuse a lawyer of being a "daffidowndilly," a colloquial term for ambidexter in the north of England.5 4 Judicial discussion of daffidowndillies involved the important task of ascertaining an imputation's common meaning to determine actionability. 55 An interesting development was the variance of the words describing ambidexterity, which were sometimes metaphorical, using images of ambidexterity rather than specifically describing the particular instance of disloyalty. The cases recount imputations of "playing on both hands" or "taking money from both parties" both in conjunction with ambidexterity, as occurred in Kygbey, and without that specific word as occurred in Coke v Baxter. In Ryvett v Markes, the plaintiff prevailed, alleging that the defendant said, "[M]e hathe played one on bothe parties and hathe two faces in one hoode and he shall well know within 53. CP 40/1360 m 1057 (Trinity Term 1578). The plaintiff said he was "unus attomatorum... de banco per diversos annos iam elapsos." The defendant attempted to justify the words by describing the plaintiffs double-dealing in Chancery, which the plaintiff denied, pleading de injuria. The amount of the verdict was not indicated although the plaintiff had alleged C300 in damages, a relatively high amount Interestingly, the plaintiff voluntarily remitted all damages.
54. Although no actual suit by a lawyer accused of being a daffidowndilly was found, a number of opinions used the term as an example of how some words implied a reference to an attorney and, therefore, "touched" the plaintiff in his profession. In Litman v West, the first such case, the actionability of the word "daffidowndilly" is attributed to Hutton, which may refer to Common Pleas justice Richard Hutton. The imputation was: "He is a cozener, and hath cozened me of 20s." The court found for the plaintiff, rejecting the defendant's argument that the words were too general and did not touch the plaintiff's profession as a lawyer. (1682) . In his treatise, Sheppard included "daffidowndilly" among a number of examples of actionable colloquial words in a section titled "Words actionable in some Countries only." Sheppard, Artion Upon the Case for Slander at 5-6 (cited in note 22). In particular, he stated, "So to say of a man in some places, as in the North Country, He is a Daffidowndilly, where it is taken for this, He is an Ambidexter: These, and such like words, spoken in the places where they are known, will be actionable." Sheppard also suggested that the words might be actionable if spoken to someone who did not understand their meaning, as that person might ask those who did know. Id at 6. The meaning of "daffidowndilly" seems to have persisted into the twentieth century as evidenced by its use in fiction. In Unnatural Death, a character explaining that apparently meaningless words may have a legal meaning says, "For example, the word 'daffy-down-dilly.' It is a criminal libel to call your lawyer a daffydown-dilly. Hal Yes, I advise you never to do such a thing. No, I certainly advise you never to do it." Dorothy L. Sayers, UnnaturalDeath 151-52 (Harper 1995) (first published 1955).
55. Some of the cases, such as Litman, 124 Eng Rep 392, found the accusation clearly actionable, while others required explanation in pleadings and suggested using the innuendo clause to do so. Such a use of the innuendo was more expansive than its conventional use to specify an individual identified only by a personal pronoun in the imputation. Helmholz, Sekct Cases at lxxxvii, xcvii (cited in note 11). In Preston's Case, the court said, "[Ain action lies for saying, Thou art a daffidowndilly (innuendo) ambidexter." 74 Eng Rep 1064. In Annison, the court said, "To say of a lawyer, He is a daffadowndilly, bath been adjudged actionable; and to say of a merchant, He hath eaten a spider, Mr. Justice Wild said was actionable: but all these must be with averments what the meaning is." 124 Eng Rep 924. these two dayes.
'56 The declaration included the word "arnbidexter," which may have strengthened Ryvett's case even though it was still not one of the English defamatory words. 57 In Shire v King, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant said of him, 'Thou art a paltry fellow, thy credit is fallen, thou dealest on both sides, and dost deceive many that trust thee." 5 8 The defendant argued that the words were not actionable. The court unanimously disagreed, stating that "he doth deal on both sides" touched him in his profession and were slanderous: "[1]f one saith to a lawyer, 'he is an ambidexter,' there cannot be a greater slander." 5 9 In other cases, the defamatory words suggested disloyalty, such as "overthrowing' the client's cause, although there is insufficient information to determine whether ambidexterity was involved. 60 During this period, the law generally treated all of these different forms of defamatory words as actionable. The newer and different imputations prompted some judicial reluctance, which cast doubt on their clear actionability and foreshadowed the difficulties that emerged in the seventeenth century. John March's discussion of Snaggv Grey in his 1647 treatise Actionsfor Slander suggests that the actionability of the expanded imputations of disloyalty prompted a need for judicial interpretation. Attempting to explain the court's holding that an accusation that an attorney "reveal[ed] the secrets of my cause" was actionable, March states that "the words are to be taken as they were spoken," "not of lawful revealing to the judge" but as "revealed to those from whom they ought to be concealed." 61 In the determination of the ordinary meaning of "revealing the secrets of my cause," the court emphasized the words "he will deceive you" spoken "jointly" and "in the same breath." The words were slanderous because they "touch the Plaintiff in his art and science, which require men of great trust and confidence,"
56. KB 27/1223, m 237 (Trinity Term 1567). The plaintiff alleged that he was "homo eruditus in legibus huius regni Angliae reputatus." The defendant pleaded not guilty and asked for a jury trial.
57. Ryvett alleged that the plaintiff "was brought into infamy as an ambidexter and false dissimula- is the foolishest and simplest attorney towards the law; and if he doth not overthrow your cause, I will give you my ears. He is a fool and an ass." The court upheld a verdict for the plaintiff, stating, "Mo say that, 'an attorney will overthrow his client's cause,' is a great slander, and toucheth him in his place."
61. The treatise also noted that the defendant imputed deceit and that the declaration alleged that the words were malicious. March, Actions for Slander at 85 (cited in note 22). and thus were in "derogation of the confidence and fidelity of the Plaintiff." 62 Although in this instance the court interpreted the words according to their common and contextual meaning, later courts subjected words to more rigorous inquiry.
D. THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY
Although the actionability of accusing a lawyer of ambidexterity continued into the seventeenth century, recovery became more difficult. 6 3 In the seventeenth-century ambidexterity cases, as in lawyer defamation cases generally, some judges hesitated to find imputations actionable. Courts often attributed to words their common meaning in light of the intent of the speaker under the circumstances." Seventeenth-century imputations of disloyalty, like those of the prior century, commonly accused the lawyer of playing on both hands. However, the results of the seventeenth century cases are less predictable than those of the earlier cases. If the imputation contained words that shed additional light on the meaning of "both hands," "both sides," or "both parties," then it was usually actionable. 65 In Shire v King, the court noted the importance of the additional words regarding deception, stating "all the words being coupled together, ought to have reference to his calling, and cannot be taken but in malam parten. ' 66 The court equated the coupling to calling the lawyer "an ambodexter." 67 Without additional words in the imputation or declaration, actionability was more doubtful. Stating that the plaintiff was "a good attorney, but that he will play on both sides" 68 was held actionable in some cases, but not in all. In Dawtry v Miles, where a client accused his lawyer of taking "fees of both hands ... being 64. As one court said, "Words shall be taken in such sense as they are spoken." Peard, 79 Eng Rep at 934. The defendant said of the plaintiff, a barrister, "He is a dunce, and will get little by the law." Id at 933. In moving for arrest of judgment, the defendant argued, "[A]n action lies not for calling one a 'dunce'; for Dunce was a great learned man, and he was thereby compared to him, and then no discredit." Id. The defendant was referring to the medieval philosopher, Duns Scotus. F.W. Maitland, Englicb Law and the Renaissance 18 n 41 (Cambridge 1901). In rejecting the argument, the court said, "[Wiords are to be intended according to the common speech; and dunce, in common intendment and speech, is taken for one of dull capacity and apprehension, and not fit for a lawyer." Peard, 79 Eng Rep at 934.
65. "Playing on both hands" was used broadly, perhaps connoting deception without reference to disloyalty in the representation of a client. In Rich v Holt, the defendant accused the plaintiff, inter a/ia, of being "a paltry lawyer, and use to play on both hands," because the plaintiff actively provided information leading to the indictment of a person after stating a contrary intention to that person. [8:423
Attorney for me," the court saw the question as "whether this would amount to as much as if he had said the Plaintiff was an ambidexter."
69 Two justices thought the words "may have a double intendment, for it may be intended that hee took fees with both hands lawfully." But they added, "[J]f he had said that he was an ambidexter, an action would lie, for this is vo [c] aris, and cannot be otherwise intended. '70 Two other justices disagreed, saying "the action would lie, for that the words amount to as much as ambidexter, and are the english of it, and a direct affirmation and no Metaphor."
'71 The record did not reveal a judgment in the case. 72 Two contemporary commentators, March and Sheppard, thought that the words should be actionable, with the former agreeing that the words meant ambidexterity and that to interpret them otherwise "would be to make a construction against the express meaning of the words.1 73 The views of March, Sheppard, and the latter two judges seem correct. In the context of all the words and the express reference by the defendant to the plaintiff as his attorney, the common meaning of the words would be an imputation of classic ambidexterity. Moreover, many of the medieval discipline and civil liability cases expressly referred to taking money from both parties. The doubt of the former two judges can only be explained by their hostility toward defamation actions; their interpretation may illustrate an application of the rule of mitior sensus.
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Dawrey v Miles, 2 Jam I (KB Michaelmas Term 1605), discussed in March, Actions for Slander at 78-79 (cited in note 22
). The client also said, "Dawtrey is a knave, a cozening knave ... and by knavery suffered me to be condemned at Ipswich at Greens suit wilfully, being Attorney for me." Perhaps reflecting skepticism toward defamation cases, the court held only the words quoted in the text as "considerable in this Case." March seems to be discussing and quoting an unpublished report of the case.
70. March, Actions for Slander at 78-79 (cited in note 22). It is not clear how it would have been lawful to take fees with both hands unless the phrase is given absolute literal meaning. The original says ev cartis, which may be a misprint. R.H. Helmholz has concluded that it should have been written voc arti, an abbreviation for vocabulum artis, meaning a term of art. E-mail from Helmholz to Jonathan Rose (April 7, 1999) (on file with author). Yelverton, one of the judges, may have had a conservative attitude toward these cases, even though he had represented slandered lawyers. In another case that might have involved ambidexterity, the other judges thought it was defamatory to call a lawyer a Judas. Starker v Taylor, 124 Eng Rep 406 (1629). This was so because calling someone a Judas commonly referred to a betrayer "[aind what can be more scandalous to an attorney, than to be a betrayer of his clyents?" Id at 407. Yelverton disagreed, saying, "ludas was a traytor to Heaven, and therefore this reason should not be drawn to earth, to cause actions between men." Id at 409.
71. March, Actionsfor Slander at 79 (cited in note 22).
72. Id at 79-80.
73. Id at 79; Sheppard, Action Upon the Casefor Slander at 91 (cited in note 22) (stating that although "it hath been doubted whether an Action would lie for these words ... this Case seems to others to be out of doubt Actionable.") 74. A notable judicial means of restricting actionability was the rule of mitior sensus, which construed words "mildly" and was sometimes applied in an extreme fashion that led to absurd results. See Imputations of breaches of confidentiality also met with some resistance, again with ambiguous results. Sheppard noted a case supporting the principle that it was defamatory to say "Thou didst disclose thy Clients Counsel to his Adversary." He also said that it was actionable to say "Hee revealed the secrets of my Cause" or "Hee did disclose my counsel." 75 Other cases drew finer distinctions. One court said, "If one says of a lawyer, he did reveal the secrets of my case; that is not actionable, for he might reveal it to a Judge: but if he said, Goe not to such a one, he did reveal the secrets of my case, that is actionable." 76 It seems unlikely that a client would publicly accuse his lawyer of wrongdoing by revelation to a judge. Such a strained interpretation manifests the judicial skepticism toward defamation. In context, the common meaning of the words seems defamatory. Moreover, the courts had been disciplining lawyers for such breaches of confidentiality since the end of the thirteenth century. 7 7 A 1655 indictment of a lawyer for ambidexterity made several references to client confidences and their improper revelation. 78 The indictment used language similar to downplayed the rule of mitior sensus as a reaction to the flood of litigation. He saw the rule as a legitimate affirmation of the requirement that the defamation subject the plaintiff to criminal penalties. He concluded that during much of the sixteenth century plaintiffs commonly won cases and words were interpreted as commonly understood and that the rule was not strictly applied until the later Elizabethan period. Helmholz, Select Cases at xcii-xcv (cited in note 11). "In 1600 the days in which the doctrine of mit'or sensus was to reach the heights of subtlety and of perversity still lay in the future." Id at xcv. Baker stated that this rule ceased to be applied in 1714 and after then words were always interpreted "in their most natural and obvious sense." See Baker, Introdutfion at 370 (cited in note 22). Heimholz said that the cases in the reports, as contrasted with those in the plea rolls, may contain a disproportionate number ofmitiorsensus cases because of the reporters' interest in such cases. See Helmholz, Select Cases at lxvii (cited in note 11). He also implied that the ecclesiastical courts did not use the mitior sensus rule in any strict sense but may have "toyed" with it.
75 In addition to more careful scrutiny of defamatory words, the manner of pleading the lawyer's office, a well established requirement, changed. 81 Although it was often sufficient for the plaintiff to declare that he was a lawyer and that the words touched his profession, 82 some cases seemed to be more demanding.
Some courts required an explicit allegation that the plaintiff was a practicing lawyer when the defamatory words were spoken. 83 In one case, where an attorney was accused of taking money from his client's opponent for not acting in his client's case, the court arrested a judgment in favor of the attorney, because he failed to allege that he was an attorney at the time the words were spoken. 84 A later court raised a question about a slander suit by a barrister whose client accused him of dealing falsely and joining with the other side. The court stated that "the plaintiff ought to aver he is a practiser, for he may be a barrester and not practise." 85 The court-imposed requirements seem particularly harsh in the former two instances, since the accusations clearly imply that the words were spoken of the plaintiff in his professional capacity. In both cases, the courts said the words were otherwise actionable. It would not be fair to conclude that the law changed significantly from the prior century. More often than not, imputations were actionable; only some judges evinced doubts. Throughout the seventeenth century, explicit accusations of ambidexterity continued to be clearly actionable.
86 A problem only arose when different words were used to impute disloyalty, since courts did not give a 79. For example, it says that in taking money from the second client and revealing the secrets of the first client, John Walker acted "falso secrete clandestine corrupte subdole deceptive injuste sinistre et ex iniqui lucri causa" and "falso callide et deceptive.. 83. In, for example, Moore v Snne, the King's Bench reversed a judgment in favor of an attorney, who was accused of being a "forgeing knave" and had declared that "he [had] been an attorney for several years now passed." 81 Eng Rep 675 (1619). The grounds for reversal were that the attorney had failed to allege that he was an attorney when the words were said: even if he had been an attorney for the "30 or 40 past years" that did not show that he was one "at the instant time when the words were spoken." Id. The court indicated that the defamatory words themselves, such as calling a lawyer an ambidexter, would satisfy , this requirement. The court also stated that the result might have been different if he had declared that he had been an attorney in the years just passed.
84. Sma/es v Smith, 123 Eng Rep 626 (1616). Smayles alleged that he "had been an attorney." The defamatory words alleged were: "He... took corruptly five marks of Brian Turner, being against his own client, for putting off and delaying an assise against him." 85. [8:423 dear indication of when such accusations were actionable. It is not clear that ambidexterity-based lawyer defamation suits faced the same opposition or skepticism that characterized seventeenth century general judicial attitudes toward defamation.
E. THE INFLUENCE OF THE AmBIDEXTERITY CASES ON OTHER DEFAMATION CASES
Ambidexterity defamation cases, having established the actionability of accusations of lawyer disloyalty, influenced court determinations of what constituted slander in other contexts. 7 In fact, the ambidexterity cases may have set the stage for the more general recognition of occupational and professional defamation. 88 Use of ambidexterity cases arose in at least three types of situations. First, courts cited accusations of ambidexterity to contrast other cases involving lawyers where the words were not actionable, e.g., because the words were too general or otherwise did not touch the plaintiff in his profession. 8 9 Second, the court used the ambidexterity cases to determine the actionability of accusations directed at persons in other occupations. In finding against a merchant accused of falsity and keeping a false debt-book because the merchant failed to declare that customers or others would not deal with him or did not trust him, the court illustrated actionability by analogy to statements that a lawyer was an ambidexter or unfaithful. 90 In another case involving a clerk accused of dishonesty in keeping accounts and "set[ting the town together by the ears; and so... they were never in quiet;" the court said the words were actionable as they "touch him in his office and credit; for his office is an office of trust" and compared them to saying of a lawyer, "Thou didst disclose my counsel" or 'Thus didst deliver my evidence to my adversary." 9 1 The courts also used the ambidexterity cases with imputations against doctors. In holding for a surgeon accused of "poisoning the wound of A.B. for gain of money," because the words touched him with "falsity or wicked dealing in his Art or Science," the 87. In Roe v Clarges, a justice of the peace who held several other governmental offices was accused of being "a Papist" 90 Eng Rep 42 (Hilary Term 1694). The King's Bench affirmed the verdict for the plaintiff, relying on the argument that such words meant the plaintiff could not carry out his office of high trust and honor. The plaintiff cited, inter alia, "the cases of ambidexter... to shew that words ought not to be taken in their radical sense, but according to such a sense as they are usually accepted in, and under- 92 Finally, the courts used accusations of ambidexterity in a variety of defamation cases to denote clearly actionable imputations. One court referred to actionable ambidexterity in determining whether an action would lie for an imputation of a crime using metaphoric words.
9 3 In holding against a plaintiff who claimed that defamatory words had impaired his ability to sell his land, the court demanded allegations and proof of particular loss; the court contrasted words slandering a profession such as, inter alia, "to say of a lawyer that he was an ambodexter, where there was no need to allege any particular cause of damage nor prove it with evidence. '94 Although the courts did not rely exclusively on the ambidexterity cases in judging whether words were slanderous of other occupations or persons, they often used them to illustrate actionability.
III. PUBLIC AND PROFESSIONAL IMAGES OF DISLOYAL LAWYERS
A lawyer-plaintiff wrongfully accused of disloyalty generally prevailed. When the specific conflict of interest was described or the word "ambidexter" used, the plaintiff had no trouble recovering, and the pleading and proof requirements were modest. That plaintiffs succeeded in these cases is not surprising. Disloyalty was considered a serious moral failing that was inconsistent with a lawyer's duty and function. As will be shown, "ambidexter" was a recognized term, commonly and distinctly used about lawyers. 95 To call a lawyer an ambidexter adversely affected the lawyer's reputation, client relationships, and fees and, thus, was clearly defamatory. When these defamation cases arose in the sixteenth century, courts had been disciplining lawyers for ambidexterity for over two hundred years. Ambidexterity was a crime; and defamation suits for imputations of a crime were the most successful initial secular defamation cases, as they were in ecclesiastical defamation. However, from a societal perspective, ambidexterity was not on par with theft, murder, or villainy-all common imputations in defamation cases, with theft being the most common. Conflict of interest does not seem to in- 95. Illustrating how particular words affected different professions differently, one court said that it was slanderous to call a lawyer an ambidexter, but not a merchant; conversely it was defamatory to say a merchant was bankrupt, but not a lawyer. The court gave a number of examples of words that would be actionable by a lawyer. volve the same moral turpitude as more common crimes do. Nevertheless, courts made statements such as: To say of "a lawyer, 'he is an ambodexter,' there cannot be a greater slander" 96 and "[W]hat can be more scandalous to an attorney, than to be a betrayer of his clyents?" 97 Courts equated calling a lawyer an ambidexter with accusing an apothecary of poisoning his customers or a doctor of killing his patients.
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The interesting question is why, in early modern defamation cases, the charge of disloyalty and the specific word "ambidexter" carried such opprobrium. To impute such misconduct to a lawyer was to accuse him of the highest professional sin. As the subsequent discussion will show, several factors may account for the stigma. The shame associated with disloyalty and the word "ambidexter" reflects notions within the legal system and, perhaps more significandy, the general society, evidenced in literary images of lawyers and religious discourse.
A. THE CONCEPT OF DISLOYALTY 1. The "Common Learning" and "Inherited Wisdom" of the Legal Profession
An examination of legal attitudes toward the disloyalty of lawyers should not focus unduly on doctrine. From the inception of the regulation of lawyers in the thirteenth century, judges developed loyalty norms that contributed to the actionability of accusations of ambidexterity. However, it seems possible that the significant stigma attached to disloyalty was the product of a nondoctrinal legal culture, and that the judicial treatment of these imputations reflected the profession's "common learning" and "inherited wisdom" concerning a lawyer's duty of loyalty. As John H. Baker has explained, the "common learning" embodied "the shared assumptions of a learned profession" and "the collective and growing wisdom of the profession." 99 Baker discussed these notions in terms of an "extra judicial legal world 100 of ideas about substantive law, but an "extra judicial legal world" 00 of ideas about substantive law, but they would have influenced judicial attitudes in the courtroom. It seems plausible that beliefs about the obligations of the legal profession that ultimately impacted the world of law inside the courtroom had their origins in the broader legal culture. The common erudition regarding the professional taint of disloyalty is reflected in several ways. First and foremost, as illustrated in the previous discussion of the cases, judges made numerous strong statements about the heinous nature of accusations of ambidexterity. In doing so, it seems likely that as members of the legal profession they had views on the importance of loyalty norms that were developed outside the courtroom and expressed within it. Other important occasions on which judges reflected the "inherited wisdom" were serjeant creation ceremonies. The lord chief justice would deliver an address "explaining the ethics of the profession and the standards of conduct expected of serjeants."'1' These grandiloquent speeches emphasized lawyers' duties to justice, the importance of honesty and obligations of trust, and the need to avoid "subtile imagination and craft" and "deceipte and duplicite."' 0 2 Loyalty and confidentiality are implicit in these exhortations. Occasionally, the chief justice referred specifically to the duty of confidentiality and to the prohibition on deceit and collusion in the Statute of Westminster I, chapter 29.103 It is likely that the judges had a special interest and competence in judging on the degree of taint associated with violations of professional norms.
1°4 This seems particularly true with disloyalty since such behavior undermines the functioning of the justice system, the operation of which was the duty of judges. Contemporary treatises also reflected harsh attitudes toward disloyalty that evidence the legal profession's "common learning." In Acdionsfor Slander, March discussed the accusation of revealing client confidences in Snagg v Grey 105 and said the plaintiffs profession required "great Trust and Confidence so the words being spoken before in derogation of the confidence and fidelity of Plaintiff, are [
which offered practical advice in pleading, concluded by noting the "crying, reigning evil amongst Lawyers" of failing to appear on behalf of a client and stating that if "hee absented himselfe in favour of the adverse party," he should be expelled from practice and punished. 10 7 Further evidence of "common learning" might be found in the attorneys' oath of office and the use of juries of practicing attorneys to establish rules of conduct and to investigate and try particular instances of misconduct.
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Much of Baker's writing on the "common learning" involves the Inns of Court and their role in legal education. The learning exercises of the Inns seemed to focus exclusively on substantive law and the development of lawyering skills such as rhetoric, logic, and advocacy. 10 9 Some of them refer explicitly to the "common learning."' 110 However, none of the learning in the Inns appears to deal with the importance of loyalty or more general instruction in legal ethics. 1 On the other hand, given the socialization and professionalization process that occurred in the Inns, it seems plausible that professional behavioral norms, specific instances of lawyer misconduct, and breaches of confidentiality and loyalty duties would have been topics of discussion even if not part of the formal instructional program. John Dawson believed that the senior lawyers in the Inns influenced the attitudes and values of the legal profession. 112 Although substantial evidence does not explicitly support this broader view, it seems logical.
Other considerations may shed light on the lack of instruction in ethics. Since ethics relate to personal honor and morality, ethical instruction may not have been perceived as a proper part of professional education. Lawyers and judges may have felt that desirable professional norms were more a product of inherent aspects of human nature than of formal education. Books of advice for students and practitioners of law provide some support for this view. William Fulbecke's A Direction or Preparaive to the Study of the Lawe identified "the good qualities wherewith the Student of the Lawe ought to be furnished" as love of God, humility, temperance, diligence, wisdom, and courtesy or mildness." 3 Wil1am Lambarde's morally, ethically, and religiously based attack on lawyers, judges, and the legal system may reflect similar views." 4 Anthony Benn's Of The Lawyers stressed a lawyer's duty to provide "good counsel" to his country, to consider "the higher interests of the commonwealth," to credit "the honor of his calling," and always to be "improving on the knowledge of his profession."' 15 As Wilfrid Prest noted, this work and others of the same period are "suffused with the neoclassical ideal of the noble counsellor." ' 6 Also it may have been thought that instruction in matters related to morality ought to be external to professional training rather than part of it. A long tradition in religious education dating from the Carolingian era and revived in medieval humanism sought to produce the perfect man through the study of virtue as a means of producing ethical behavior; such education merged intellectual and ethical learning." 7 Early modern humanism reflected similar sentiments. Thomas Elyot proposed that lawyers study "morall philosophie, whiche teacheth both vertues, maners, and ciuile policie." 8 
Elyot said:
I think verily if children were brought up as I have written, and continually retained in the right study of very philosophy until they passed the age of 21 years, and then set to the laws of this realm... undoubtedly they should become men of so excellent wisdom that throughout all the world should be found in no common weal more noble counsellors.... Moreover when young men have read laws, expounded in the orations of Tully, and also in the historyies of the beginning of laws, and in the works of Plato, Xenophon, and Aristote... they shall be thereto more incensed, and come into it the better prepared and furnished. . . . And they whom nature thereto nothing moveth, have not only all that time, which many now a days do consume in idleness, but also have won such a treasure, whereby they shall always be able to serve honora-[8:423 have provided a foundation for professional ethics and the importance of loyalty. John Cooke infused his 1645 proposals to reform law and legal education -with both humanistic notions of the lawyer's duty to justice and the religious character of law and a lawyer's necessary traits. 119 The speeches of the chief justices at sixteenth century serjeant creation ceremonies also echoed religious and humanistic notions. 1 2° More generally, given that professional ethics are related to moral qualities, the social and religious life of an early modem lawyer might have been considered a significant determinant of proper professional behavior. Along those lines, an early modem religious writer stated that "euery man must joyne the practise of his personall calling, with practise of the general calling of Christianitie. ' 1 2 1 Further, as role models, senior lawyers and judges may have influenced the development of ethical sensitivities. Thus, several factors may explain the absence of formal instruction in professional ethics.
In sum, there is some evidence in the "common learning" and "inherited wisdom" of the legal profession for the opprobrium resulting from accusations of disloyalty. The "legal mind' 22 of the profession most likely included a negative view of professional disloyalty, emerging from "that intimate brotherhood of judges and serjeants [as] they lived and ate and traveled together and devoted themselves increasingly to refining and perfecting their 'common erudition." ' 123 After all, in most cases, betraying a client or revealing confidences to an adverse party is directly inconsistent with a lawyer's function.
bly their prince, and the public weal of their country, principally if they confer all their doctrines to the most noble study of moral philosophy which teacheth both virtues, manners, and civil policy: whereby at the last we should have in this realm sufficiency of worshipful lawyers, and also a public weale equivalent to the Greeks or Romans. Thomas Elyot, 1 The Boke Named the Gouemour 141-43, 161-62 (Burt Franklin 1967) (reprint of 1531 edition). Elyot was the son of Richard Elyot, the plaintiff in the first defamation suit by a lawyer. See E.yot v Tofte, KB 27/1006 m 62; Elyot, The Boke Named the Gouernour at xxvi-l.
John Cooke, The Vindcation of the Professors and Profession of Law (164 5).
For example, in stressing humanistic ideals, Cooke noted the belief that lawyers should not maintain an unjust cause on behalf of a client or be on the opposite side of the truth: "For truly to speak well in a bad cause is but to goe to Hell with a little better grace without repentance." Id at 8-9. He said that a lawyer is a soldier whose sword "is but a servant to justice consecrated by God, to maintain and defend the law." Id at 37. With reference to the spiritual and moral nature of the law and lawyers, he noted the importance of "Scripture being the Touchstone of all humane actions.... [L] aw is the science of things humane and Divine." He saw religion as "a necessary study for a lawyer" and believed that students should first study divinity for three years and then "4 [years] in the study of the moral and rational part of the Common Law which is the rule of speedy justice to give every man his due with expedition." Id at 25, 56. Cooke was a barrister in Gray's Inn. He served as a primary prosecutor of Charles I and was executed as a regicide in 1660. Simpson [8:423
Religious Ideas and Discourse
The canon law system is the logical starting place for a discussion of the impact that the importance of loyalty in religious discourse had in stigmatizing a lawyer accused of ambidexterity. The ecclesiastical courts treated both ambidexterity and disclosure of a client's confidential information as serious forms of lawyer misconduct. In his scholarship on canon law, James Brundage found that the duties of loyalty and confidentiality were well entrenched in the ius commune, the principles combining canon and Roman law, long before the end of the thirteenth century, when these duties appeared in the English common law. Violations of these obligations were treated as "treachery," "particularly reprehensible," and subject to harsh penalties. 24 Relying on Justinian and Gratian, Brundage noted that betraying a client could cause a lawyer to be declared infamis, a disgraced person who was not only disbarred but also lost most of the rights and privileges of citizenship. 25 A lawyer who divulged a client's confidential information to his adversary could also be charged withfalsum, which could result in forfeiture of property and exile. 126 The works of canonists such as Hostiensis, Durant, and Baldus also reflect antipathy toward disloyalty and the improper disclosure of confidential information. 127 The papal constitution of Pope Martin V prohibited such conduct in the papal curia, and a violation by a lawyer resulted in excommunication. 128 We ordain that, as the general laws require, no advocate or proctor who has once given counsel or representation to one party in a case may thereafter advise or represent the opposing party in that same case or pursue or defend his cause, unless he be required to do so by a judicial order for the distribution of advocates or proctors. In that case he shall never reveal to his new client anything that he learned from the first party, unless he is instructed to do so by that party. And if he shall contravene the aforesaid, he shall incur the sentence of excommunication and the other penalties prescribed by law, shall be deprived of his office, and shall nevertheless be liable to the offended party. Clearly, canon law not only prohibited professional disloyalty but, as its harsh penalties evidence, also viewed such misconduct as particularly shameful.
Loyalty was also an important topic in broader religious discourse. Religious attacks tended to focus on the "hired gun" who injured society and the justice system, but scorn for the deceitful lawyer embraced disloyalty as well. The well known biblical injunction "No man can serve two masters, ' Both the treatment of ambidexterity in the canon law system and the attacks on lawyers in broader religious discourse reveal that professional disloyalty was considered highly immoral and dishonorable.
denote secrets is interesting as the most common word used for client confidences was consilium, although seerta was also used occasionally. The precise nature of the confidential information divulged is often unclear, although it is possible that consilium was a broader term that included the litigation strategy and other advice to the client as well as confidential matters communicated by the client to the lawyer. 
Literary Images
E.F.
Tucker has demonstrated that there was a well established medieval and early modern canon of anti-lawyer literature, mostly satirical. 37 He noted that the "common lawyer" was really "a set of public images" that included literary ones, and he identified at least five distinct literary images of lawyers. 38 The one that is most relevant to this study is the pettifogger, an image associated with abusive litigation that "provide[d] a convenient rubric under which to discuss the more generalized conventions of law satire, and to mention those historical individuals who have brought dishonor and disrepute to the legal profession." 39 According to Tucker, the main identifiers of the pettifogger were negative professional qualities and misconduct, including "ambidextry (the crime of exacting fees from both parties to a lawsuit)." 140 By the end of the sixteenth century, the image of the ambidextrous lawyer began to appear in plays and poems. For example, in the Elizabethan historical play Woodstock, the character Robert Tresilian is told that Richard II will appoint him lord chief justice and ponders how, in the meantime, to stay in the good graces of the king and his enemies. Illustrating another way in which a lawyer was two-faced, he says:
But yet until mine office be put on By kingly Richard, I'll conceal myself; Framing such subtle laws that Janus-like May with a double face salute them both. Tucker has described Tresilian as illustrating the "lawyer-devil" type in English literature that originated in fifteenth-century morality plays. He has characterized ambidexterity as "the Janus-like sin of Vice characters." Tucker, Intruder into England at 72 (cited in note 137). Woodstock was apparently well known to Shakespeare, and some considered it a sequel to his Richard I.
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The poem "On Cheverel the Lawyer" recites:
No cause nor client fat will Cheverel lease. But as they come on both sides he takes fees, And pleaseth both: for while he melts his grease For this, that wins, for whom he holds his peace.
142
In other words, so that he never loses clients nor fees, the lawyer engages in ambidexterity, and by a trick keeps both clients happy. 143 Similarly, in the satirical play Topone, as part of a plan to produce gifts for Volpone by tricking greedy men hoping to become his heir, Volpone's servant tells Voltore, a greedy lawyer, that he deserves to be Volpone's heir and that Volpone admired:
Men of your large profession, that could speake To euery cause, and things mere contraries Till they were hoarse againe, yet all be law; That, with most quick agilitie, could turne and re-turne; make knots, and undoe them; Give forked counsell; take provoking gold On either hand, and put it up.
144
In biting satire, Jonson creates an image embodying all the common forms of lawyer misconduct, including ambidexterity.
Perhaps even more trenchant, although in the early eighteenth century, is Jonathan Swifts description of the plight of Gulliver, who must hire a lawyer when his neighbor wrongfully claims his cow. Gulliver proclaims to suffer two disadvantages: since his lawyer has been trained to defend falsehood, being an advocate for justice will be "unnatural" and attempted "with great awkwardness, if not with ill-will"; and he must proceed with caution "or else he will be reprimanded by judges and abhorred by his brethren, as one that would lessen the practice of law."' 145 Thus, Gulliver says that to keep his cow he must "gain over 142. Ben Jonson, Poems, Epigram 37 (Oxford 1975) (Ian Donaldson, ed). 143. I am grateful to Curtis Perry of the English Department at Arizona State University for his assistance in understanding this poem. Perry explained that "Chev'rill (meaning soft pliable leather) acts in such a way as to never turn down a client or a fee. In a given case he takes fees from both sides and gets away with it ('pleaseth both') by a clever trick: he argues vehemently ('melts his grease') for the side he knows will lose. That way, both clients feel they've had their money's worth, the one because of the lawyer's efforts and the other because of the victory." E-mail from Curtis Perry to Jonathan Rose (September 26, 2000) (on file with author).
144. Ben Jonson, 5 Vooone, Act I, Sc 11, 1153-59 (1605). Voltore had brought an expensive plate for Volpone. Later in Act IV, Voltore slanderously and falsely convinces judges that a merchant is vicious and his wife lewd. In Act V, when Volpone extends the deception by having news spread that he is dead and that his servant Mosca is his heir, Voltore relents and begins to tell the truth about the merchant and his wife. But when Voltore learns that Volpone is actually alive, he changes his testimony again, claiming he had been possessed by the devil when he had told the truth. [his] adversary's lawyer with a double-fee; who will then betray his client, by insinuating that he hath justice on his side."' 46 The words, "double-fee" and "betray" tersely capture disloyalty and its taint. An interesting example of transactional ambidexterity appears in The Honest Layer. Griffin, a miscreant attorney and foil to the virtuous protagonist of the title, represents Bromley and Sager, two characters on opposite sides of a lease dispute. Griffin tries to persuade Bromiey and Sager to reach an agreement in order "to be fleeced both, so [Griffin] might be kept warme in [their] wool." Thus, he says to Bromley, "[W]hat will you judge me worthy of, if I perswade him to relinquish his right?" Bromley gives him "twenty angels" and tells him if he is successful, he will be Bromley's "everlasting Atturney." Griffin then asks Sager, "What will you give mee to draw Bromley to a good hansome composition?" Sager, on the other hand, refuses to pay until Griffin is successful, saying he will "give no bribe." 47 At one point, Griffin meets men who voice hostility toward corrupt lawyers and foreshadow his undoing. 148 Bromley later complains that "Theeves, Lawyers, Rogues, Harlots, and Inne-Keepers, are mens purgations. Griffin has cheated mee: he tooke twenty angels from mee. Theeves tooke 'hem from him. He promis'd to draw Sager to compound; now the day's gone against me."' 149 After numerous complicated plot turns, Griffin and the other evil characters are punished.
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Judgments concerning the impact of these literary images on the opprobrium associated with accusations of disloyalty must take into account the intentionally overdrawn, even caricatured, satirical nature of the portraits. Some claim that the contemporary criticism of lawyers presented an exaggerated image by ignoring those whose conduct was exemplary.'
51 Regardless, the literature shows that ambidexterity was seen as a common form of lawyer misconduct. The satirical portraits of lawyers had roots in real life misconduct 52 suggests a congruence, if not an interrelationship, between contemporary religious discourse and literary images. Like the former, publicly recognized literary images of the disloyal lawyer help understand the high degree of professional taint resulting from a slanderous accusation of ambidexterity.
More General Social and Political Norms
Loyalty is woven deeply in longstanding social and political norms. Many values, conventions, and rules identify "unbreakable loyalty as an ideal moral quality." 154 General discussions of morality extend to notions of the loyalty of lawyers and link confidentiality with loyalty. 155 Some contemporary views held betrayal as the most heinous form of disloyalty and not betraying as the "minimal loyalty." 156 As stated by George Fletcher, "[T]he worst epithets are reserved for the sin of betrayal.... The specific forms of betrayal-adultery, treason, and idolatry-all reek with evil."' 157 William Blackstone said that "treason... imports a betraying, treachery, or breach of faith [and] is the highest civil crime, which (considered as a member of the community) any man can possibly commit."' 58 Treason, a form of betrayal, was an important political topic in early modem England. 159 During the later middle ages, the word traitor meant one who betrayed a personal trust, such as the attorney-client relationship, especially when an oath was violated.1 60 In the medieval and early modem eras, oaths were a means of demonstrating loyalty and other obligations; breaking them was considered most serious. David Ibbetson has noted that "oath-breaking ranked along side murder in the hierarchy of wrong doing." 161 Of course, no one would contend that lawyer disloyalty should be treated as equivalent to treason. On the other hand, lawyer disloyalty is a form of betrayal and a breach of trust; 162 161. See Ibbetson, A Historical Introdut'on at 4 (cited in note 22) (explaining that an oath created a relationship between God and the oath swearer and that no temporal sanction was available as God would punish the miscreant). Oaths had long played an important legal role in assuring trustworthiness, perhaps dating back to Roman law. See Green, A Criis of Truth at 59-64 (cited in note 160).
162. Dante reserved a special place in hell for individuals who betrayed trust by committing fraud or fundamental loyalty norms and attitudes toward treason may have influenced social attitudes toward lawyers accused of ambidexterity. Rampant public attacks on the legal profession in the late medieval and early modern eras accentuated the negative image of disloyal lawyers. 63 Complaints against barristers for taking money from both sides and for disclosing a client's confidential information were common in the sixteenth century 64 During the civil strife and associated reform of the seventeenth century, "there was a widespread distrust and hatred of the lawyers in the popular movement. Ambidexterity was fairly common in this period, and charges of colluding with clients' opponents were part of the attack on lawyers.
168 A 1645 tract opposing lawyers as members of Parliament stated that it was not unusual "for a Lawyer to bee of Counsell with one party, and to prevaricate, and bee of confederacy under hand with the adverse party. 119) . Cooke wrote Vindication in response to this advertisement, though he was sympathetic to some of the criticisms and the need for reform. One of his concerns, the large number of lawyers, inspired an oft-quoted comment comparing lawyers to "the Grasshoppers of Aegypt that devoured the whole land, many of them being growne rich." Id at 25. The advertisement made the same point, likening lawyers to "locusts," another common critical metaphor. Id at A4r.
Who (for his counsel) takes fees of either, And in the end leaves neither a feather... Fools they fell out, and beggars they agreed.
70
A 1617 almanac said that the corruption of lawyers would lead to "terrible abusion of the laws by some double-feeing attornies. ' '171 The severe political attitudes toward corruption in the seventeenth century may have intensified the already hostile reaction to lawyer deceit and misconduct. 172 Attacks on lawyers and reform proposals 73 increased further the dishonor connected with disloyalty. In sum, the opprobrium attached to accusations of ambidexterity was grounded in attitudes within the legal profession, canon law, and wider religious discourse, as well as in contemporary literary images and more general social and political norms and debate.
B. TBE WORD "AmBlDEXTER"
Understanding the stigma ascribed to the commonly used defamatory word "ambidexter" involves an inquiry into its use in legal circles, contemporary literature, and religious discourse. Before doing so here, some philological exploration into the word's history is useful.
The History of the Word "Ambidexter" and Its Legal Use
The Oxford English Diionaty (OED) states that the first use of the word "ambidexter" was as a legal term meaning " 175. 1 Oxford English Dictionay at 269 (cited in note 174). Samuel Johnson's dictionary has similar meanings for ambidexter, ambidexterity, and ambidextrous, as well as the more common meaning, the [8:423 tries make the legal context clear by comparing double-dealing with "practicising on both sides"' 1 7 6 and citing a number of legal, literary, religious, political, and philosophical works generally from the early seventeenth century. "Ambidexter" and its variants receive similar treatment in law dictionaries. The word's inclusion in The Interpreter of Words and Terms in the early seventeenth century may mark its first appearance in a legal dictionary. The Interpreter defines "ambidexter" as a juror who takes bribes from both sides, an action for which statutory punishment is imposed.
177 A 1762 dictionary repeated the same definition.' 7 8 Black's Law Dictionagy defines "ambidexter" as a term "applied anciently"
to a lawyer or juror who took fees from both sides. 7 9 "Daffidowndilly," a term for daffodil, was a synonym for "ambidexter" in northern England. As evidenced by its reference in i'tman v West, 1 80 in context, "daffidowndilly" means "party colored," 181 that is, "having divers colours."' 182 The pejorative sense of the word derives from the fact that some daffodils have multiple colors in the same flower, a visual image of disloyalty and floral metaphor used by Shakespeare.
183
The actual use of "ambidexter" in the legal system is generally consistent with the dictionary definitions, but appears earlier than indicated. Its probable first legal appearance, outside of an official document, is in Henry de Bracton's ability to use both hands. Johnson cites Aesop to illustrate the double-dealing connotation. With reference to "ambidexter," he comments that "this sense is ludicrous," with no further explanation for this puzzling comment. 1 A Dictionagy of the English Language (1Oth ed 1810).
176. 1 Oxford English Dictionagy at 269 (cited in note 174). In the biblical story, Jacob's wages for tending Laban's flock were to be the speckled and spotted cattle. By duplicity, he increased the production of such cattle by the strong stock; he ended up with a large number of strong cattle and Laban with the weaker ones. Genesis 30:25-43, 31:1-16. 1 am grateful to Curtis Perry, Arizona State University Department of English, for his assistance on the derivation and meaning of "daffidowndilly." Perry concluded, "I think it is safe to assume that this implies doubleseeming or duplicity in the context you are working on." See E-mail from Perry to Jonathan Rose (Sept 30, 1997) (on file with the author).
Cowell, The Interpreter of Words and Terms Used Either in the Common or Statute Laws of This Realm
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De Legibus et ConsuetudinibusAng'ae. "sheriffs and ambidextrous bailiffs who take bribes from both sides." 184 The text merely repeats an Article of the Eyre, this particular article probably having been in use from 1246 onwards.
185 The word appears occasionally in fourteenth-century cases to refer to attorneys and others who took fees from both sides in exchange for representation or support. 186 As discussed earlier, medieval cases disciplining and imposing civil liability on ambidextrous lawyers did not regularly use the word, although it began to appear in early sixteenth-century defamation cases. A 1343 order directing justices to inquire into all felonies and trespasses against the peace used the word "ambidexterity." 1 87 Treatise writers, such as Anthony Fitzherbert and Henry Finch, continued to use this term during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries to refer both to jurors and attorneys.
188 Thus, since the medieval era, "ambidexter" was (stating that among trepasses on the case punishable by the king is calling "an attorney ambodexter, or to say he dealeth corruptly."). The Oxford English Dictionary cites this use-actually the 1613 law french version, Nomotechnia-as the first use in the sense of an attorney or other individual taking fees from both parties. As the discussion has shown, it had been used that way for over 200 years.
the legal system's term for a lawyer who engaged in a conflict of interest, a meaning well established by the sixteenth century and the inception of secular defamation.
Religious Use of Ambidexter
"Us thinkith that hermofodrita or ambidexter were a god name to sich manere of mene of duble astate"' 189 stated the sixth of the twelve conclusions posted on doors of Westminster Hall in 1395 by the Lollards, religious reformers descended from the Oxford theologian and philosopher John Wycif.1 90 The introduction to the conclusions read: 'We poor men, treasurers of Christ and his apostles, denounce to the lords and commons of the parliament certain conclusions and truths for the reformation of the holy church of England." 191 In the sixth conclusion, the Lollards were attacking the simultaneous holding of religious and secular offices. This polemic began:
Mhat a king and a bishop all in one person, a prelate and a justice in a temporal cause, a curate and an officer in worldly service, make every realm out of good rule. This conclusion is openly shown, for temporality and spirituality be two parts of the holy Church, and therefore he that has taken himself to the one should not meddle with the other, because no one can serve two masters. 192 The Lollards asked that Parliament remove religious officers from temporal office and said that they should spend all their time on pastoral duties. 193. Twelve Conclusions at 26 (cited in note 189). Wyclif and the Lollards' main concern, based on the Bible and canon law, was the natural incompatibility of God's work and worldly affairs. They believed that the time demands of the former left no time for the latter and that clerks engaged in secular affairs to curry favor with the powerful. I am grateful to Fiona Somerset, at the University of Western Ontario, for directing my attention to John Wyclif and the Lollards.
194. See Hudson, Hermofodrita orAmbidexterat 43 (cited in note 192).
[8:423 two contrary masters, but one, namely God. 2 0 2 The notion of ambidexterity had other positive religious uses. 203 Despite these positive uses, "ambidexter" was well recognized in religious usage as an epithet. 20 4 The Lollard coupling of the term with "hermofodrita," a term largely ignored by Dymmok and the commentators, 205 underscores its negative connotation in the sixth conclusion. This metaphor for holding dual offices may suggest unnaturalness and perhaps a note of scorn. Both Wyclif and Edward III associated this ambidexterity with troubled political and social events, 206 adding further evidence for the argument that the negative connotation of the word in late medieval religious discourse contributed to the opprobrium attached to it in the lawyer defamation cases.
3. Literary Use of"Ambidexter"
The term "ambidexter" was also established in literary usage. The term was associated with the law-devil figure, which E.F. Tucker identified in many early modern English works.
2 0 7 The law-devil figure, which may have roots in the classical advocatus character of Latin and Italian comedies, emerged in the early modern period as an English common lawyer figure. Tucker believes the image is not rooted in comedy, but that its origins "stem from morality drama of the fifteenth century, in which the legal profession is always on the side of vice."
Citing Tresilian's Janus-like" image in Woodstock, Tucker notes that ambidexterity was a 'Janus-like sin of the Vice characters," corresponding to common misconduct of contemporary lawyers. 209 He ties the lawyer's sin of ambidexterity to "the famous vice character of Ambidexter" in Thomas Preston's Camyses, The
King ofPersia. 210 Cambyses is a story about the life and death of a king and his "many wicked deedes and tyrannous murders." 211 Although subtitled "A lamentable Tragie," the play is in the tradition of morality literature. Character names include Murder, Commons cry, Commons complaint, Diligence, Cruletie, Meretrix, Shame, Otian, and Ambidexter (the latter not being a lawyer). The words "Enter the Vice" announce Ambidexter's first appearance in the play. 212 He identifies himself, "My name is Ambidexter, and signifies one, that with both hands can play." He goes on to outline the wide destruction that he will cause. 21 3 In the end, Ambidexter runs away after being beaten physically, pleading "no more, no more, I beseech you hartily: Even now I yield, and give you the maistry. '214 Throughout the play, the repeated metaphor of playing on both hands, associated with the vice character Ambidexter, has a dear negative connotation. 215 In the later play Ignoramus by George Ruggles, the main character, Ambidexter Ignoramus, is a lawyer. 216 The last name, Ignoramus, suggests a foolish character, though the portrait of ignorance is negative and abusive rather than comical. 217 Scholars have identified the first name, Ambidexter, spoken several times clear defamatory nature of these imputations of disloyalty.
IV. PROFESSIONAL REPUTATION, CULTURE, AND DEFAMATION
According to early modern scholars, cultural changes and legal developments in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries made professional reputation especially vulnerable to attack. In particular, attitudes toward honor, the increasing importance of reputation, and changes within the legal profession combined to create a climate conducive to defamation suits brought by lawyers. The professional reputation of lawyers was "peculiarly vulnerable to defamation," since the era stressed personal honor and relationships.
230 "A man's honor, in this period, was the essence of his reputation in the eyes of his social equals: it gave him his sense of worth and his claim to pride in his own community and it contributed to his sense of identity with that community." 231 John Cooke tied the need to make defamation actionable with preservation of honor and reputation, "the very life blood of a Gentleman and the sweetest flower in every mans Garden." 232 Defamatory accusations directed at lawyers were adjudged in the community "court of reputation"; if not defended and corrected, the resulting negative public opinion would permanently tarnish the lawyer's reputation. 233 Contemporary lawyers were sensitive to the need to guard their reputations. John Davies said "no men of any other calling or profession, whatsoever, are more careful to preserve their good name and reputation" than common law law- [8:423
2OfAmbidexters and Daffidowndillies 463 yers. 2 -4 As a result, he concluded that "the dignitie of the Profession do accordingly dignifie all Professors thereof which are qualified with learning and vertue fit for so worthy a calling.
2 35 Moreover, the "face to face '2 36 nature of contemporary society underscored lawyers' need for the remedies defamation suits offered.
Another cultural change was the increased importance of careers and occupations, and their pursuit as a means of social and economic mobility. During the middle ages, universities provided a foundation for "a golden age of careerism" in the "lucrative sciences," including canon and civil law. 237 Subsequently, careerism broadened substantially into commercial life. During the sixteenth century, the growth of the guilds evidenced further occupational expansion and the economic and political impact of increased participatory citizenship. 238 An early seventeenth-century religious tract viewed the pursuit of a calling or vocation as "ordained and imposed on man by God for the common good" and stated that everyone "without exception must have some personal and particular calling to walk in."239 The early modem era strengthened the tie between an individual's identity and his profession and the ability of a profession to advance one's social status. 240 An uncountered slanderous attack on a professional threatened his social advancement and undercut the investments in a culture that was conducive to this mobility.
Another important development involved the impact of law on culture. During the later middle ages, law made important contributions to intellectual and cultural life through humanist learning and political ideas. 241 This "permeation of law into the wider culture" continued throughout the early modem era. 242 Eric Ives has emphasized the cultural impact of the institutionalization of legal education through the Inns of Court. 243 The rise of the Inns contributed to the growth of the profession and to the pursuit of a legal career as a means of social mobility. Membership in an Inn provided a vehicle for shaping both the profession's self-image and the perception non-lawyers had of it, views which impacted the development of professional reputation. 244 Thus, defamation threatened an individual's pursuit of a legal career, social advancement, and professional reputation. During the early modern era, important developments in the profession accompanied the cultural changes that affected lawyers. Commentators have suggested that public recognition of the actual practice of law as an occupation and as an honorable status apart from its social significance established a different professional identity for lawyers. 245 "The inherent social importance and moral worthiness of the functions associated with the lawyer's calling" conferred honor on practitioners. 2 4 6 A contemporary religious treatise on vocations stated that law was one of the best callings. 247 This general view coincided with the profession's self-image. In 1615, Sir John Davies said that "the profession of the Law is to be preferred before all other human professions and sciences as being the most noble ... the most necessary ... and the most meritorious."
characterized "a worthy professor of law" as "a star in the firmament of the Commonwealth" and as "lux in tenebris wheresoever he dwelleth." 2 49 Scholars have further noted that, during this period, the modem legal profession began to take shape and exhibit a more institutional nature. Wilfrid Prest and David Lemmings have detailed this process in connection to the upper branch of the profession, the emergence of barristers, and the role of the Inns. 250 The lower branch of the profession, those more commonly plaintiffs in defamation suits, manifested similar development 2 51 Christopher Brooks has documented in detail the rise of attorneys during the early modem period, noting their increased numbers and cohesion, as well as aspects of professional organization such as admission oaths and rules of practice. 252 Moreover, provincial lawyers increased in importance and influence. 2 53 These changes in the legal profession and its image help explain the frequency of defamation suits by lawyers, particularly those accused of ambidexterity and the beneficial effect of such litigation.
V. CONCLUSION
The preceding discussion explains the significance of defamation suits by lawyers accused of ambidexterity, which constituted a large portion of lawyerbrought defamation suits. 254 The cases demonstrate that an imputation of disloyalty was clearly defamatory and that the particular word "ambidexter" carried strong stigma and opprobrium. The public and professional images of lawyers go a long way in explaining why such accusations were the most slanderous defamations of a lawyer, the imputation of the highest professional sin. The norm of loyalty was part of the professional culture and the word "ambidexter" had a long history in law, and other contexts, as a pejorative term. The profession's articulation of loyalty obligations, as seen in judicial decisions and speeches and the works of legal writers, had a rhetorical as well as a normative quality. These manifestations reflected the profession's self-image, which it wanted to project to those outside the profession. Perhaps more importantly, the images of disloyal lawyers and usage of the word "ambidexter" in religious discourse and literary works reflected a public understanding reinforcing the dishonor resulting from such accusations. Cultural changes involving the importance of honor, reputation, and the pursuit of a profession and legal developments regarding the identity and organization of the profession in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries enhanced the likelihood and beneficial nature of defamation suits by lawyers accused of disloyalty.
More generally, one might see these accusations and the resulting defamation suits as a juxtaposition of the legal profession's private nature and public image. Ambidexterity occurred as lawyers carried out their private function of representing clients, most often in litigation. The misconduct arose with suffident frequency that, when coupled with generally hostile attitudes toward the legal profession, a public image of the disloyal lawyer emerged. Religious, political, and literary usages made this image recognizable to many outside the legal profession. Members of the public were important as they were the accused lawyer's current and future clients. Public opinion was important in the collective sense as it was the foundation of professional reputation. Broader social and political notions of loyalty and the heinous quality of disloyalty underscored the ignominy of the disloyal lawyer.
The defamatory nature of accusations of ambidexterity draws initially on ethical norms developed within the legal profession to govern practitioners' private roles, but acquires more significant substance from public images of the disloyal lawyer. Certainly, it would seem to be the latter that caused accusations to produce substantial injury to professional reputation. The interrelationship between early modern defamation suits, legal ethics, professional and public images of lawyers, and professional reputation is a manifestation of the profession's distinctive and ambivalent nature. Unlike other professions, the courts have regulated the admission and conduct of lawyers through both statutory authority and inherent judicial power; 255 the Ordinance of 1292 made attorneys "officers of the court. ' 2 56 Moreover, the civil liability of lawyers had a different origin and evolution from that imposed on other professionals.
2 57 Some defamatory words were actionable when directed at lawyers, but not when used to accuse others.
25 8 Although satire and political criticism also targeted other professions, attacks on lawyers were qualitatively and quantitatively more substantial, resulting in public images unique to lawyers. These distinctive characteristics reflect the profession's ambivalent nature by exemplifying the public nature of the profession, whose role in representing clients is a private one. The profession's dual dimension may help explain its longstanding internal struggles and [8:423
